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We propose a family of sifting-less quantum-key-distribution protocols which use reverse-
reconciliation, and are based on weak coherent pulses (WCPs) polarized along m different directions.
When m = 4, the physical part of the protocol is identical to most experimental implementations
of BB84 [1] and SARG04 [2, 3] protocols and they differ only in classical communications and data
processing. We compute their total keyrate as function of the channel transmission T, using general in-
formation theoretical arguments and we show that they have a higher keyrate than the more standard
protocols, both for fixed and optimized average photon number of the WCPs. When no decoy-state
protocols (DSPs) [4–6] are applied, the scaling of the keyrate with transmission is improved from T2
for BB84 to T1+
1
m−2 . If a DSP is applied, we show how the keyrates scale linearly with T, with an
improvement of the prefactor by 75.96% for m = 4. High values of m allow to asymptotically approach
the keyrate obtained with ideal single photon pulses. The fact that the keyrates of these sifting-less
protocols are higher compared to those of the aforementioned more standard protocols show that
the latter are not optimal, since they do not extract all the available secret key from the experimental
correlations.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Over the last three decades, quantum key distribution
(QKD) has emerged as the main application of quantum
information [1, 7]. In most experimental realizations,
the legitimate partners — traditionally named Alice and
Bob — use the BB84 protocol with weak-coherent-pulses
(WCP), i.e. Alice sends polarized coherent states to Bob,
and Bob measures their polarization to obtain the raw-
key. Alice and Bob then post-select a subset of the
measurement to obtain the sifted-key from which the
cryptographic key is extracted. If, for each pulse, Eve
would send a single photon, there would be no way
for an eavesdropper — traditionally named Eve — to
learn anything about the sifted key without introduc-
ing errors. But, with WCP s, Alice only approximates
single-photons, and she sometimes sends multiphoton
pulses, on which Eve can get all the information through
photons-number splitting (PNS) attack [8]. SARG04
[2, 3] showed that, with the same physical states and
the same detection of BB84, and changing only the post-
processing it is possible to enhance the robustness to-
ward PNS attacks. This was obtained by changing the
encoding of the raw key bits in the qubits, changing the
sifting in such a way that Eve only gains partial informa-
tion from 2-photon-pulses and needs to wait for the rarer
3-photon-pulses to gain the full information. However,
for the same pulse intensity, SARG04’s rate is the half
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of BB84 at low losses, because of its lower sifting rate.
As shown in [3] SARG04’s robustness can be increased
by using m polarizations instead of 4, at the price of a
lower sifting rate ∝ m−3. Similarly, greater values of m
give the same increased robustness to our protocol while
essentially keeping the relatively high rate of BB84.
These examples show that it is possible to improve the
performance of a QKD protocol by changing the classi-
cal data post-processing without changing its physical
implementation. The work presented here is mainly mo-
tivated by the research of the optimal way to extract a
secret key from a BB84-like protocol with WCPs of aver-
age photon number µ. Although we do not compute an
upper-bound of the amount of private information one
can extract from such an implementation, we propose
a family of protocols without sifting, which have better
performances than BB84 and SARG with the same setup.
This sifting step in BB84 and SARG04 can be seen as an
arbitrary choice of encoding, and its absence allows us to
describe the protocols more directly using information
theoretic quantities. These protocols, similar to continu-
ous variable protocols [9, 10] seem to perform better than
both BB84 and SARG04, at least close to the ideal regime
studied here, where errors-rate, finite-size effects and
key-extraction algorithm imperfections are negligible.
Section I we describe this protocol family; in particu-
lar, the protocol itself is described in subsection I A, and
the keyrate in the ideal case with perfect single photons
is computed in subsection I B. In section II we first in-
troduce some notation ( subsection II A), used later to
describe the two kind of errorless attacks (Intercept - Re-
ar
X
iv
:1
30
6.
60
61
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  3
 Se
p 2
01
3
2send with Unambiguous Discrimination (IRUD) attacks in
II B and PNS attack in II C). The optimal combination of
these attacks is analyzed in III, both for implementation
without (III B), and with decoy states protocols (DSP)
(III C), and finally in III D we compare the sifting-less
protocol with BB84. The conclusion of this analysis is
drawn in section IV.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL FAMILY
A. Description of the protocols
Each protocol of the family is characterized by the
numberm ≥ 3, the total number of possible polarizations
used in the protocol. To simplify the analysis, we will
suppose that the polarizations are uniformly distributed
along the great circle of Poincaré’s sphere representing
the states with linear polarizations. Alice randomly
choses x ∈ ~0,m − 1 and sends a phase-randomized
weak coherent pulse (WCP) linearly polarized in the di-
rection xθm, with
θm =
def
2pi
m
. (1)
The quantum state sent by Alice will depend on the
number of photons n contained in this pulse. If |0〉 and |1〉
are the two states of circularly polarized single photons,
the state of a n-photon-pulse polarized along xθm is
|x,n,m〉 =
def
|xθm〉⊗n , (2)
with
|θ〉 =
def
1√
2
(
|0〉 + eiθ |1〉
)
, |θ〉 〈θ| = 1
2
[
1 e−iθ
eiθ 1
]
. (3)
If m = 4, one has the 4 states used in BB84 [1], SARG04
[2, 3] as well as LG09 [11]. We chose to study the generic
m-state case because it does not change the complexity
of the analysis.
Bob measures the polarization of the pulses after a
propagation into an attenuating channel characterized
by its transmission T. The public comparison of a small
subset of the measurements allows Alice and Bob to
statistically determine the characteristic of the channel,
namely its yield Y – the probability for Bob to get a click
– and its qubit error rate (QBER). In this first analysis,
we will suppose this statistical evaluation to be exact,
neglecting the finite size effects [12]. We will also limit
ourselves to the errorless case, where the QBER is 0, ex-
cepted in the conclusion where the influence of errors is
briefly studied.
In the following we will also denote with X (respec-
tively Y) the classical variables representing the bit val-
ues encoded by Alice (respectively measured by Bob).
The ambiguity of Y being also the total transmission
yield should be clarified by the context, and will be ex-
plicitly resolved otherwise. A,B and E will represent the
quantum sytems of Alice, Bob and Eve.
There are several possibilities for Bob’s measurement,
specifically if m is odd. We will limit Bob’s apparatus to
single-photon detector based set-ups, similar to the one
used in the BB84 and SARG04 protocols. This limita-
tion will prevent Alice and Bob to extract all the infor-
mation allowed by the Holevo bound [13–15] or to use
continuous-variable detection set-up like the one used
in the LG09 protocol [11].
Since Bob’s measurement is based on single-photon
detectors, Alice and Bob need to postselect-away the
event when Bob has received no photon i.e. when Bob’s
detectors have not clicked. This can be done by one-
way classical communication from Bob to Alice. The
kept events typically constitute a fraction Y = 1 − e−Tµ =
Tµ + O(T2µ2) of the sent pulses if the sent WCPs have
a mean photon number of µ, and are sent through a
channel of transmission T.
When Bob receives a single photon, he performs the
POVM
{
2
m
∣∣∣yθm + pi〉 〈yθm + pi∣∣∣}y∈~0,m−1. The pi dephas-
ing does not change anything if m is even, but increases
the mutual information I(X:Y) between Alice and Bob
when m is odd. In particular, it ensures that, for any
state sent by Alice, one outcome (y = x) of Bob’s mea-
surement is impossible.
B. Keyrate without eavesdropping
If Alice sends perfect single photon pulses, the lack of
errors guarantees a perfect secrecy of I(X:Y|m) bits of the
key, where I(X:Y|m) is the mutual information between
Alice and Bob’s data. This quantity is easily derived
from the conditional probabilities
P(y|x,m) = 1m
(
1 − cos(y − x)θm) . (4)
The equiprobability of them states encoded by Alice, en-
sures the equiprobability of the m possible values mea-
sured by bob. The Shannon entropy of Bob’s measure-
ment is therefore
H(Y|m) = logm (5)
and then
H(Y|X,m) = logm − 1
m
m−1∑
k=0
(1 − cos kθm) log(1 − cos kθm);
(6)
I(X:Y|m) = H(Y|m) −H(Y|X,m) (7)
=
1
m
m−1∑
k=0
(1 − cos kθm) log(1 − cos kθm). (8)
The above sum can be seen as the mth Riemann sum
of (1 − cos kθ) log(1 − cos kθ) taken with m samples. It
3therefore decreases slightly with m, from log 32 = 0.5850
bits form = 3 to 12pi
∫
(1−cos kθ) log(1−cos kθ)dθ = 0.4427
bits in the continuous limit m→ ∞. For m = 4, we have
I(X:Y|m = 4) = 12 log 2, i.e. the same rate as BB84.
When Bob receives more than one photon, several de-
tectors can click. This gives him more information than
single clicks, so neglecting this case, as done above, is
pessimistic. This corresponds to Bob randomly choos-
ing between the various detection results.
In a reverse reconciliation (RR) scheme [9, 10], Al-
ice and Bob can share a common key of length I(X:Y)
provided Bob sends to Alice at least H(Y|X) bits of side-
information. For example, when m = 4, Bob needs to
send 1.5 bits per pulse. This can be done by revealing his
measurement basis (1 bit/pulse) and using the syndrome
of a good erasure correcting code (see e.g. [16, Chapter
50]), which will be slightly longer than 12 bit/pulse. In-
deed, when Bob has revealed his basis measurements,
Alice knows which bits of Y are not correlated with X
and this corresponds to an erasure channel of rate 12 .
Note that I(X:Y|m = 4) is the same as the mutual in-
formation but that Alice and Bob need only 1.5 bits of
one-way communication to extract the secret key, instead
of 2 bits of two-way communication. Their use of era-
sure correcting codes instead of interactively throwing
some bits away is at the heart of the resistance of this
protocol against PNS attacks: on 2-photon-pulses, Eve
can keep a copy of the pulse sent by Alice, and, even if
she knows the basis of Bob’s measurement, she ignores
whether Alice sent a state in the right basis or not. There-
fore, in this case, Eve’s measurement has at best a 25%
error-rate, giving her at most h( 14 ) = 0.1887 bits of infor-
mation — where h(·) is the binary entropy — while Alice
still has half a bit. The net keyrate of 2-photon-pulses is
then 0.3113 bits. In BB84, on the contrary, Alice reveals
her basis choice, living her on equal footing with Eve for
2-photon-pulses.
Note that whenm is even, the above idea for the recon-
ciliation can be generalized i.e. Bob reveals logm − log 2
bits for the basis
{
y
[
m
2
]}m/2−1
y=0
where the square bracket
[· · · ] is a short-hand for “modulo · · · ”. Bob then uses
the appropriate error correcting code for the remaining
information. We are then in a situation where Alice has
different known error rates 12
{
1 − cos
((
x − y
[
m
2
])
θm
)}
for
different bits while Eve only sees the average error rate.
The following paragraphs will study the above state-
ments more formally, in the asymptotic and error-less
regime.
II. TWO FAMILIES OF EAVESDROPPING ATTACKS
If Alice sends perfect single photon pulses, the lack of
errors guarantees a perfect secrecy of I(X:Y|n = 1) bits
of the key. However, if Alice uses weak coherent pulses
(WCP) some attacks become possible without introduc-
ing errors. Eve can either perform an intercept resend
with unambiguous state discrimination attack (IRUD)
[17, 18] (see section II B), at the price of blocking some
pulses, or photon number splitting attacks (PNS) [19–
21] (see section II C), as well as a combination of the two
attacks.
In any case, since Alice’s pulses are phase random-
ized, Eve’s optimal attack can be described by a quantum
non-demolition measurement of the photon number n of
Alice’s pulse followed by an action which depends on n
[8].
A. Some useful notations
In order to simplify the analysis, the state (2) of n
photons polarized in the direction xθm can be written
|x,n,m〉 = |xθm〉⊗n = 2− n2 (|0〉 + eixθm |1〉)⊗n (9)
= 2−
n
2
2n−1∑
b=0
ei‖b‖xθm |b〉 , (10)
where |b〉 is the tensorial binary development of b ∈
~0, 2n − 1, and ‖b‖ its Hamming weight, i.e. the number
of bits set to 1 in the binary development of b. Note that
all terms with the same Hamming weight w modulo m
have the same phase prefactor eiwθm = ei(w[m])θm . These( n
w[m]
)
vectors are orthogonal. We have defined(
n
w[m]
)
=
def
∞∑
d=0
(
n
w + dm
)
, (11)
where
( n
w+dm
)
= 0 for w + dm > n. Let’s define, for each
w ∈ ~0,m − 1,
|w[m]〉n =
def
1√( n
w[m]
) ∑
b∈~0,2n−1
b≡w[m]
|b〉 . (12)
We can then rewrite the state |x,n,m〉 as
|x,n,m〉 = 2− n2
m−1∑
w=0
eiwxθm
√( n
w[m]
) |w[m]〉n . (13)
For the following discussion it will also be useful to
mentally group the pulses with the same number of pho-
tons n. For each of those groups we can then define bn as
the fraction of blocked pulses, un as the fraction of pulses
on which an unambiguous discrimination is successful,
and pn as the fraction where a PNS attack is performed.
For each value of n it is also useful to define the specific
conditional probabilities Yn (photon-number dependent
yield), defined as the probabilities for Bob to see his de-
tector clicking when Alice has sent a n-photon-state:
Yn = (1 − bn). (14)
4If for each pulse we represent with Pn|µ the probability
of having n photons knowing that the average photon
number is µ, we have
Y =
∞∑
n=0
Pn|µYn. (15)
B. IRUD attacks
As shown in equation (13), the state of an n-photon-
pulse sent by Alice can be written
|x,n,m〉 = 2− n2
m−1∑
w=0
eiwxθm
√( n
w[m]
) |w[m]〉n . (16)
If Eve makes an IRUD attack, the success probability
of her unambiguous measurement is given in [22] as
P(∆|m,n) = 2−nm min
w∈~0,m−1
( n
w[m]
)
. (17)
This probability is not null iff n ≥ m − 1, and its value
increases each time n increases by 2. Its first nonzero
value is 2−m+1m for n ∈ {m+ 1,m+ 2}. Since she does not
want to introduce errors, Eve has to block the pulses on
which an IRUD attack has failed. She can then resend
(with no errors) a fraction un of the original pulses as big
as
un = min
( P(∆|n,m)
1 − P(∆|n,m)bn; 1 − bn
)
. (18)
In other words, she can intercept and resend P(∆|n,m)1−P(∆|n,m)
pulses for each pulse she blocks, without introducing
any error. For example, for m = 4 and n = 3, Eve can
perform an unambiguous state discrimination with a
success probability P(∆|n = 3,m = 4) = 12 . This means
that, for each 3-photon-pulse Eve has blocked, there is
another she has unambiguously discriminated and re-
sent to Bob without error.
On remaining pn = 1− bn − un pulses, she can perform
a PNS attack, keeping n−1 photons and transmitting the
remaining one unperturbed to Bob. We have
pn =
[
1−P(∆|n,m)−bn
1−P(∆|n,m)
]
+
(19)
where [· · · ]+ is a shorthand for max(· · · ; 0).
C. PNS attack
Since one can construct a Markov chain Y ↔ X →
|x,n − 1,m〉, and since the latter is the state held by
Eve when she performs a PNS attack, χ(Y:E|n,PNS) <
I(Y:X). The inequality is strict because the last tran-
sition is not reversible. In other words, PNS attacks
without IRUD can never reduce the net RR-keyrate
Kn = S(Y:X) − S(Y:E|n,PNS) to 0, contrarily to the BB84
protocol.
In order to compute the efficiency of the PNS-attack,
one needs to compute the density matrices associated
with n-photon-pulses. The density matrix correspond-
ing to the state defined in (16) is:
|x,n,m〉 〈x,n,m| = 2−n
m−1∑
w,w′=0
ei(w−w′)xθm
√( n
w[m]
)( n
w′[m]
)
× |w[m]〉 〈w′[m]| (20)
=
m−1∑
D=1−m
eiDxθmMD,m,n, (21)
where we have defined, for any integerD ∈ ~1−m,m−1,
the (shifted) m ×m diagonal matrix
MD,m,n =
def
2−n
m−1∑
w=0
√( n
w[m]
)( n
w+D[m]
) |w[m]〉 〈w + D[m]| .
(22)
Let ρn,m be the generic n-photon-state sent by Alice.
One has then
ρn,m =
m−1∑
x=0
1
m |x,n,m〉 〈x,n,m| =M0,m,n. (23)
When Bob measures Y = y, and Eve keeps n photons,
her state conditioned on Bob’s measurement is given by
ρy,n,m =
m−1∑
x=0
1
m (1 − cos(x − y)θm) |x,n〉 〈x,n| (24)
= ρn,m − 1m
m−1∑
x=0
cos(x − y)θm
m−1∑
D=1−m
eixDθmMD
=M0 −
m−1∑
D=1−m
MD
2m
m−1∑
x=0
{
eiθm(x(D+1)−y) + eiθm(x(D−1)+y)
}
=M0 − e−iyθm2 (Mm−1 +M−1) − e
iyθm
2 (M−m+1 +M1).
(25)
Note that in the above equations, the indices m and n
have been omitted forMD for the sake of simplification.
The Holevo limit of the information Eve can gather on
Bob’s measurement through a collective PNS attack is
χ(Y:E|n,PNS) =
def
S(E|n,PNS) − S(E|Y,n,PNS) (26)
= S(ρn−1,m) − S(ρy,n−1,m). (27)
These entropies are easily computed numerically and
decrease slowly with n.
Since they are independent of m iff n ≤ m − 1, the
corresponding S(Y:E) will also be identical in this case.
In other words, the information leaked to Eve in m-state
protocols are identical to the continuousm→∞ limit for
n-photon-pulses when n ≤ m−2, and the only difference
at n = m − 1 comes from the IRUD attack.
5III. GLOBAL EAVESDROPPING STRATEGIES
In this section we study how Eve can exploit the im-
perfect transmission of the channel and the multipho-
ton pulses, and optimally combine the IRUD and PNS
attacks described above to decrease Alice’s and Bob’s
keyrate K.
In subsection III A we compute the total keyrate as a
function of the photon number distribution Pn|µ and the
photon-number-dependent yield Yn. This expression of
the total keyrate will be then written explicitly for the
two cases discussed in the two following subsections.
In subsection III B we study the optimal strategy for
Eve when Alice and Bob use coherent states of fixes av-
erage photon number µ.
In subsection III C we consider the case where a decoy-
states protocol (DSP) is applied [4–6]. We will see how the
knowledge of Alice and Bob of the yields Yn results in
more constraints for Eve.
Finally, in subsection III D we compare the keyrates
obtained for the sifting-less protocol to the keyrates of
BB84.
A. Total keyrate as function of µ and {Yn}
In this first subsection we will use the IRUD and PNS
attacks introduced in section II to compute a general ex-
pression of the total keyrate as a sum over n of contribu-
tions due to each (group of pulses with a given) number
of photons. This total keyrate will be a function of the
average number of photons µ and the photon-number
dependent yields {Yn}. As we have seen, the pulses
attacked with IRUD carry no secret information, since
they are either blocked or perfectly known by Eve. So
the pulses with a non-null contribution to the keyrate are
those on which only a PNS attack has been performed.
The keyrate contribution of n-photon-pulses for a
given yield Yn depends on two quantities: the proba-
bility of success P(∆|n,m) of the IRUD attack, described
in (17), and the maximal keyrate contribution Kn for a
lossless channel (Yn = 1):
Kn =
def
S(X:Y) − S(Y:E|n,PNS) (28)
which is obtained subtracting the Holevo quantity be-
tween Bob and Eve (27) from the mutual information
between Alice and Bob (8). We can write:
K({Yn}, µ) =
∞∑
n=1
Pn|µpnKn, (29)
where Pn|µ is the probability to have n photons in a WCP
and pn has been defined at the beginning of section II as
the fraction of n-photon-pulses on which Eve performs
PNS attacks. Then, using the relations pn = 1− unP(∆|n,m) =
FIG. 1: (color online) Plots of (pnKn) for m = 5 and for several
values of n, as function of Yn. These functions can be seen
as the terms of the sum in formula (32). We see how these
are qualitatively similar linear functions, with a threshold at
Yn = P(∆|n,m) where it becomes non-zero, and a different slope
Kmargn,m for each value of n and m. The value of the threshold
P(∆|n,m) is zero for n < m − 1.
1 − bn1−P(∆|n,m) and bn = (1 − Yn) we have:
K({Yn}, µ) =
∞∑
n=1
Pn|µKn −
∞∑
n=1
Pn|µ(1 − Yn) Kn1 − P(∆|n,m)
(30)
For given values ofm and n, the product (pnKn) describes
the keyrate contribution of n-photon-pulses. Its value
varies with the channel yieldYn. Figure 1 shows a plot of
(pnKn) for m = 5 and several values of n. These functions
are constantly zero for Yn ≤ P(∆|n,m), and then rise
linearly up to the maximal value Kn reached for Yn = 1.
The slopes
Kmargn,m =
def
∂(pnKn)
∂Yn
=
Kn
1 − P(∆|n,m) . (31)
define the marginal keyrates Kmargn,m . These marginal
keyrates express the contribution to the total keyrate
brought by each n-photon-pulse, when Yn ≥ P(∆|n,m).
As shown in figure 3, the value of the slopes Kmargn,m , is
often decreasing with n, but not always. We can now
rewrite the total keyrate (30) in a more compact form as:
K =
∑
n
[Yn − P(∆|n,m)]+ Pn|µKmargn,m (32)
where again, the “+” subscript means that the value
of the square bracket is is set to zero if the contained
expression is negative and is otherwise kept positive.
B. Keyrate without decoy-states protocol:
6Yn
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FIG. 2: (color online) In the upper part of this figure we report
part of the plot in figure 1, where we have highlighted one
curve out of the others (the one for n = 4). In the lower part
we have a square with two curves which delimit three regions.
The horizontal axis of the square is the same as the upper plot,
i.e. Yn, while the vertical axis represents fractional values, the
whole width of the side being “normalized” to 1. The blue line
is the curve from the upper part plot, rescaled to Kn = 1, while
the green line is a 0.5 slope line which reports on the vertical
axis the fractionYn. The three regions represent the fractions of
pulses in a group with fixed number of photons: bn = blocked
pulses (IRUD failure), un = pulses on which the IRUD attack is
successful, pn = fraction on which the PNS attack is performed.
the “budget strategy”
When Alice and Bob do not use a DSP, they do not
know the different Yn, and they only measure the global
transmission yield Y.
Eve is then free to optimize her attack considering
only this constraint of the total yield of the channel Y,
and limit the total number of IRUD attacks, so that the
total fraction of blocked pulses is
∑
n bn ≤ 1 − Y.
In other words, Eve has a total budget of 1−Y pulses to
block. When she blocks a n-photon-pulse she decreases
the keyrate byKmargn,m ifYn > P(∆|n,m) but doesn’t change
it if Yn ≤ P(∆|n,m). Her best strategy is therefore to
wisely spend her budget, attacking the pulses with an
higher marginal keyrate (31) in pritority to the ones with
a lower marginal keyrate.
The first group of pulses on which Eve can apply
IRUD, is usually the one with m − 1 number of pho-
tons. Then, for each group Eve behaves differently, de-
pending whether the value of Yn is lower or higher than
P(∆|n,m). If Yn ≤ P(∆|n,m) (see left vertical dashed line
in lower part of figure 2) she applies the IRUD attack
to all the pulses of the group, given that she has enough
“blocking budget” to spend. She stops performing IRUD
attacks when the total amount of blocked pulses reaches
the channel’s losses value (1 − Y). Eve applies the PNS
attack to all the other n-photon-pulses.
On the other hand, if Yn ≥ P(∆|n,m) for a group of
n-photon-pulses (see right vertical dashed line in lower
part of figure 2), she applies IRUD only to a fraction
1 − (pnKn) of the group of n-photon-pulses (see first two
upper parts of the vertical line, in the bn and un regions),
and then applies PNS attack to the remaining pulses of
the group.
If Eve has not enough blocking budget to perform an
IRUD attack, she will perform a PNS attack on all the
remaining pulses.
The behavior of the effective keyrate with respect to
the number of photons is described in figure 3. As an
example it shows how going from 2- to 3-photon-pulses
the contribution to the keyrate per pulse increases, mak-
ing more convenient for Eve to first apply IRUD to the
pulses with 3 photons, and only then to those with 2.
The keyrates for fixed µ = 0.1 are plotted in figure 4.
The net keyrate is 0 when all the lost pulses could be
explained by IRUD attacks, i.e. when∀n, pn = 0. LetTc be
the critical transmission below which our protocol ceases
to work. At transmission Tc, all the 1− e−Tcµ ' Tcµ trans-
mitted pulses correspond to the e−µ
∑∞
n=0
µn
n!P(∆|n,m) suc-
cessful IRUD attacks. We have then
Tc = − 1µ ln
1 − e−µ ∞∑
n=0
µn
n!P(∆|n,m)
 . (33)
If µ  1, the sum is dominated by the first non-zero
term, corresponding to n = m − 1 and we have
Tcµ ' µ
m−1
m − 1!
m
2m−1
(34)
Tc ' µ
m−2
m − 1!
m
2m−1
(35)
Tc ' m2 ·m − 1!
(µ
2
)m−2
. (36)
We essentially have Tc ∝ µm−2, showing the exponen-
tially increasing robustness of the protocol for increasing
m. This dependency is the same as SARG04, but not as
BB84, where Tc ' µ2 .
One can also numerically optimize µ for each value of
the transmission T, as shown in figure 5.
7FIG. 3: (color online) Plot of the behaviour of several quan-
tities linked to the contribution to the keyrate, as function of
the number of photons, for m = 4 protocol states. The green
dashed line represents Kmargn,m (see equation (31)) which is the
slope of the non-zero part of (pnKn) (see figure 1) contribution of
a single pulse to the keyrate. Red line represents P(∆|n,m = 4)
(see equation (17)), the probability of success of IRUD attacks,
which appears at the denominator ofKmargn,m , and blue line repre-
sents the maximal keyrate Kn, which appears at the numerator
of Kmargn,m , and is described in equation (28). From these plots we
can see how Kmargn,m is not monotone with respect to n, and for
example is bigger for n = 3 than for n = 2
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FIG. 4: (color online) Keyrates of the m-states protocols com-
pared to m-state SARG04 and BB84 with WCPs for µ = 0.1 and
m ∈ ~3, 6. The vertical lines represent the values of Tc given
by (33).
If the optimal keyrate is achieved close to Tc, we have,
for µ 1,
K ' K′m−1
(
Tµ − P(∆|m − 1,m) µm−1m−1!
)
(37)
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FIG. 5: (color online) Keyrates with optimized µ for BB84, the
m-states protocol, m-state for m = 4 and m = 16. Dashed lines
represent the approximations described in equation (39).
with K′m−1 being the (m − 1)th value of the Kn1−P(∆,n,m) co-
efficients in decreasing order. Optimizing this quantity
for µ is straightforward and gives
µopt ' 2
(
2·m−2!
m
) 1
m−2 T
1
m−2 (38)
Kopt ' K′m−1 2m−1
(
2·m−2!
m
) 1
m−2 T1+
1
m−2 (39)
i.e. the keyrate essentially varies as K ∝ T1+ 1m−2 with a
prefactor which slowly decreases with m. This approx-
imation seems in agreement with numerical results, at
least for reasonably low m (below 16). The bigger m is,
the closer one is to the ideal single-photon case, where
K = T2 log 2.
C. Keyrate, with decoy-states protocol
The DSPs are essentially designed to deprieve Eve
from the freedom to play with the yields {Yn} [4–6].
More precisely, in a DSP, Alice randomly intermixes the
pulses with nominal mean photon number µ0 used for
the normal protocol, with decoy pulses with D different
mean photon number µd, with d ∈ ~1,D. After Bob has
performed his measurement, Alice reveals the intensity
used for each pulse and Bob says whether he has mea-
sured a click or not. They can then compute the yield
Yµd of WCP of mean photon number µd and the equa-
tion (15) becomes a system of D+1 linear equations with
infinitely many unknowns:
Yµd =
∞∑
n=0
Pn|µdYn. (40)
By setting Yn = 0 for n > D, Alice and Bobcan reduce
the number of unknowns to D + 1 and solve this system
8of equation for the yields {Yn}n∈~0,D This correspond to
pessimistically assume that the pulses with n > D do not
contribute to the yield, but they can do that safely only
bay assuming that these pulses still leak all the informa-
tion I(X,Y) to Eve. Since we are interested here in the
asymptotic limit of many pulses, where the finite size-
effects are negligible, the statistic gathering only needs
a small fraction of decoy pulses, no matter how big (but
finite) D is. Therefore, we will assume from now on that
this DSP procedure is ideal and gives Alice and Bob the
yields Yn of the channel for each photon number n.
Indeed, if a DSP is performed, the “budgeting strat-
egy” described in the previous subsection III B has to
be modified, and the security analysis goes back to the
general discussion given in subsection III A. In this case
Eve can not take into account only the total transmis-
sion of the channel, so she can not perform any opti-
mization, and has to apply the IRUD attacks consider-
ing each n-photon-group separately. Moreover, as be-
fore Eve has also to consider whether Yn ≤ P(∆|n,m) or
Yn ≥ P(∆|n,m). In the first case she applies IRUD attack
to all the pulses, while in the second case she applies
IRUD only to a fraction 1− (pnKn) of the pulses, and PNS
to the rest.
In this case where DSP is applied the total keyrate
can be expressed directly by equation (32): K =∑
n [Yn − P(∆|n,m)]+ Pn|µKmargn,m .
As shown below, these keyrates scale linearly with T.
We have therefore plotted K(T)/T in figures 6 and 7 :
the roughly horizontal shapes confirm the approxima-
tive proportionality to the transmission of the channel,
either for BB84, for SARG and for the sifting-less pro-
tocol presented in this paper. In figure 6 we show the
keyrates for a fixed value of µ = 1 and in figure 7 we
have the keyrates optimized with respect to µ, for each
value of T.
D. Comparisons between sifting-less protocol and BB84
In the case without DSP, the sifting-less and BB84 pro-
tocols scale differently with the transmission: for the
sifting-less protocol we have seen how the optimized
keyrate scales as K ∝ T1+ 1m−2 (see (39)) where T is the
transmission; the correspondent keyrate behaviour for
BB84 isK ∝ T2. This qualitative difference translates into
important quantitative differences for low transmission
rates.
In the case where DSP is applied to the BB84 protocol,
only single photons contribute to the keyrate, which is
therefore
KBB84 = µe−µ
T1
1!
log 2
2
. (41)
A straightforward optimization allows to find µBB84opt = 1,
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FIG. 6: (color online) Keyrates of the m-states protocols com-
pared to m-state SARG04 and BB84 with WCPs for µ = 1 and
m ∈ ~3, 6, in the case the decoy-states protocol is applied.
Since the behaviour is almost linear in T, we have plotted K/T,
obtaining almost horizontal lines.
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FIG. 7: (color online) Keyrates with optimized µ, for the
sifting-less protocol for m = 4 and m = 16, and for BB84, in
the case DSP is applied. Again, to qualitatively prove that the
behaviour of the keyrate is almost linear in T, we have plot-
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and hence the keyrate is
KBB84opt
T
=
log 2
2e
= 0.1839 bits. (42)
For the sifting-less protocol, if in (32) we explicit Kmargn,m
9as in (31) we obtain:
KDSP =
∞∑
n=1
Pn|µYnKn
=
∞∑
n=1
Pn|µ[1 − (1 − T)n]Kn.
(43)
Values of n ≥ m − 1 imply that P(∆|n,m) , 0, then
values of Yn ≤ P(∆|n,m) are such that the contribution
to the keyrate vanishes: Kn = 0. Moreover, small values
of T imply small values of Yn, and as figure 1 shows, all
the terms n ≥ m − 1 are null when T is small enough.
Therefore we can replace the infinite sum in (43) with a
finite sum:
KDSP =
m−2∑
n
Pn|µ[1 − (1 − T)n]Kn. (44)
The hypothesis T  1 justifies also the approximation
1 − (1 − T)n ≈ nT:
KDSP ≈ T
m−2∑
n
Pn|µnKn. (45)
Finally, since we are in the case m = 4 we can explicitly
write the sum as a sum of only two terms:
KDSPm=4
T
≈ e−µ[µK1 + µ2K2]. (46)
If we substitute the value µ = 1, which gives the max-
imum keyrate for the BB84 protocol, and use the values
K1 = 0.5 bit/pulse andK2 = h( 14 )− log 22 = 0.3113 bits/pulse,
we have:
KDSPm=4(µ = 1)
T
=
1
e
[K1 + K2]
= 0.2987 bits
(47)
This result shows that even for the value of µ optimized
for the BB84 protocol, the sifting-less protocol performs
better, with an improvement of the keyrate of 62.26%.
We can also optimize the keyrate for the sifting-less
protocol with respect to µ, and compare it with the
analog optimal value for BB84. Computing the first
derivative of (46) with respect to µ it’s easy to show
that this optimal value of the average photon number
µ is µoptSLprot = 1.4794. Substituing this value in (46) we
have the optimal value of the keyrate for the sifting-less
protocol in the DSP case:
KDSPm=4(µ
opt)
T
= 0.3237 bits. (48)
This optimal value of KT or the sifting-less protocol repre-
sents an improvement of 75.96% over the analog optimal
value for BB84 protocol.
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FIG. 8: (color online) Average photon number µopt which opti-
mizes the keyrate, as function of the attenuation of the channel,
in the case DSP is applied. Different curves show µopt(T) for
different values of m. For m = 4, it is µopt ' 1.5, in accordance
with the qualitative analysis described in the text. The curves
for m = 64 and m = 128 are almost superimposed, suggesting
an asymptotic behavior. The optimal average photon number
for BB84, in the DSP case µBB84opt (T) = const = 1 is shown for
comparison.
From this starting observation, we can look into two
directions: we can either consider what happens if m is
increased, or we can relax the T  1 hypothesis.
For high values ofm (and still in the hypothesis of T 
1) the protocol becomes closer to a continuous variables
protocol. Figures 6 and 7 show how, as m increases, the
sifting-less protocol keyrate approaches the keyrate for
the ideal “BB84 with perfect single photons” protocol.
Figure 8 shows a plot of numerically calculated values
for µopt as function of the channel attenuation.
In the right hand side of this figure (high losses, i.e.
T  1) we can observe that the numerically computed
optimal average photon number stabilizes on a value of
µopt ' 4.21 as m increases.
Moreover, if we consider increasing values of m and
small values of T, pulses with increasing number of pho-
tons will have non zero contribution to the keyrate. To
have a qualitative intuition of the origin of this effect, we
can use the result (found with numerical computation),
shown in figure 9 : the product n ·Kn is roughly constant
as function of n, in the limit case m→∞, and in the case
of m finite but big, it stays constant as long as n ≤ m − 2.
Using this result, we can extend the qualitative analy-
sis done for m = 4. Looking at the expression (45) of the
keyrate, we will have m−2 non-zero terms, with the Pn|µ
coefficients multiplying the roughly constant n ·Kn prod-
uct. On the other hand, in figure 9 we have a pronounced
peak centered between 2 and 3 photons, for small values
of m (m = 4), and this explains the lower value of µopt
for m = 4 in figure 8. For higher values of m, the shape
of the plots in figure 9 are roughly similar, with a less
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FIG. 9: (color online) Plot of the product n ·Kn as function of n,
for several values of m, and low values of T (high attenuation),
for the sifting-less protocol. The plots are set to zero if the
condition n ≥ m−1 is met (see discussion above equation (44)).
The values of Kn are given by formula (28). Already for m = 64
the behavior of n · Kn is roughly constant up to high values of
n. On the left we can observe the peak for low values of n.
pronounced peak, shifted toward slightly higher values
of n. This explains the fact that in figure 8, µopt stabilizes
(for high losses) on the value of 4.21 as m→∞.
Once again, this behaviour shows the advantage of the
sifting-less protocol: pulses with high photon number
have a non-negligible contribution to the keyrate, i.e.
multiple-photon-pulses are more robust to PNS attacks.
If we now consider higher values of T, we have a
similar effect on the keyrate: even for small values of m,
as T increases we have increasing values of n with non-
zero contribution to the keyrate, as can be seen in figures
1 and 3. On the other hand figure 3 shows how for higher
values of n the value of Kn decreases, meaning that even
if pulses with high number of photons have a non-zero
contribution, this contribution becomes smaller with n.
Again, those behaviors show the higher efficiency of
the sifting-less protocol, and its robustness against PNS
attacks.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The sifting-less protocols described here are as efficient
as BB84 and more robust against PNS-attack, and are
compatible with DSP protocols. This robustness lies in
the preservation of non-orthogonality of the sent-states
by the lack of sifting.
Furthermore, this also allows to extract a reasonable
key for high m, while benefiting from the robustness
brought by the increased overlap of the sent states, con-
trarily to the m-state SARG04 variant, which while ro-
bust, has a sifting factor ∝ m−3 [3].
The most robust variant limit of this protocol is the
limit of continuous phase modulation m→∞, which ac-
tually prevents the IRUD attack. It is straightforward to
show that replacing them-state POVM used in the above
description with the simpler 4-State POVM used in stan-
dard BB84 does not change the keyrate in this limit. This
really shows that the robustness comes from the non-
orthogonality of the sent-states, which is preserved by
the lack of sifting.
Before using this protocol, we still need to investi-
gate its security in presence of a non-zero QBER. For
perfect single photons and a QBER , one can bound
Eve’s information by writing the state shared by Alice,
Bob and Eve under the form [7] |ΨABE〉 =
√
λ1 |Φ+〉 |E1〉+√
λ2 |Φ−〉 |E2〉+
√
λ3 |Φ+〉 |E3〉+
√
λ4 |Φ−〉 |E4〉, and optimiz-
ing Eve’s Holevo information S(Y:E). One then straight-
forwardly find S(Y:E|n = 1, ) = h(). For m = 4, we
have S(X:Y) = 12 (log 2 − h()), which gives a net keyrate
K = 12 (log 2 − 3h()), cancelling for a QBER  = 6.14%.
The expression is less elegant for other values of m, but
the critical value of  does not change much, varying
between 6.89% for m = 3 and 5.93% for m → ∞. Of
course, for a practical application of these protocols, the
combination of QBER and PNS attacks still needs to be
investigated, as well as finite-size effects [12], and the ro-
bustness of the system to imperfections in the data pro-
cessing and in the experimental set-up [23–25]. Another
direction worth investigating would be an unbalanced
version of our protocol, similar to BB84 with biased basis
choice [26, 27], allowing to double the keyrate to ∼ 1 bit
instead of ∼ .5 in the low-loss regime.
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